The argument from morality is a very popular one(too much actually). And to be honest that is the very motivation of mine to write this short article.
As the argument goes:
1.If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2.Objective values do exist.
3.Therefore, God exists.
Like the earlier post I check the validity of the argument by checking the premises one by one.
Premise No.1.If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
The problem with this view is that it is not established how ‘God’ grounds objective moral values, and any attempt to do so raises the immediate question: “Does ‘God’ command the good because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by ‘God’?”
This is known as the Euthyphro Dilemma.
If ‘God’ commands the good, because it is good, it implies that the objective standard for what is good does not rest in ‘God’, but in ‘good’ itself, or some other external standard or ‘good’.
If on the other hand, a good is good because ‘God’ merely declares it so, then ‘good’ is arbitrary, and subjective (to ‘God’) rather than objective. This understanding of good is called Divine Command Theory – where good is whatever God says is good. This is problematic for believers because if ‘God’ were to decree that murder and theft are good, would that make it so? Most Christians are reluctant to go down this slippery slope. It also becomes problematic to refer to ‘God’ as a good god, if good is whatever ‘God’ willed on a whim. The term ‘good’ thus loses any real meaning.
This premise isn’t acceptable.
Premise No.2. Objective values do exist.
Indeed, there are many atheists (and even theists) who argue for some form of non-theistic system for establishing objective moral values.
Many of these systems adopt a utilitarian approach, in which they basically argue moral values can be determined by evaluating to what degree an action maximises the well being of individuals while minimizing unnecessary harm (or satisfies the most number of desires whilst thwarting the least number of the same).
The other problem is that morality under this system would still end up being subjective, because any measure of what action maximises the well-being of the majority would be nothing more than an aggregate total of individuals’subjective reports on the degree of well-being that particular action has yielded.
Is the position of the theistic moral objectivist any better, with regards to objective moral values?
To conclude,premise 1 and 2 both are unacceptable and almost certainly wrong. The conclusion,then,can’t be true.
The argument from morality is a fallacious one and has irrefutable flaws. Hope the theists who read this post wouldn’t again present this argument to any other person.